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Abstract
Consider a scenario where Alice wishes to send a message m to Bob in
a time-slotted wireless network. However, there exists an adversary, Carol,
who aims to prevent the transmission of m by jamming the communication
channel. There is a per-slot cost of 1 to send, receive or jamm on the channel,
and we are interested in how much Alice and Bob need to spend relative to
Carol in order to guarantee communication.
Our approach is to design an algorithm in the framework of resource-
competitive analysis where the cost to correct network devices (i.e., Alice
and Bob) is parameterized by the cost to faulty devices (i.e., Carol). We
present an algorithm that guarantees the successful transmission of m and
has the following property: if Carol incurs a cost of T to jam, then both
Alice and Bob have a cost of O(Tϕ−1 + 1) = O(T .62 + 1) in expectation,
where ϕ = (1 +
√
5)/2 is the golden ratio. In other words, it possible for
Alice and Bob to communicate while incurring asymptotically less cost than
Carol. We generalize to the case where Alice wishes to sendm to n receivers,
and we achieve a similar result.
Our findings hold even if (1) T is unknown to either party; (2) Carol
knows the algorithms of both parties, but not their random bits; (3) Carol can
jam using knowledge of past actions of both parties; and (4) Carol can jam
reactively, so long as there is sufficient network traffic in addition tom.
∗This research was supported in part by an NSERC Discovery Grant, and NSF grants CCF-
1217338, CNS-1318294, CCF-1514383, CCF-1637546, NSF CAREER Award 0644058, CCR-
0313160, and CCF-1613772.
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1 Introduction
The wireless communication medium is vulnerable to jamming whereby an at-
tacker causes interference on the communication channel. Such attacks are pro-
hibited by US federal law, however, they occur in practice (see [18, 20]) and will
likely increase in frequency with the popularity of wireless devices.
Defending against jamming is particularly important to the security of wire-
less low-power networks (LPNs) such as wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and
the Internet of Things (IoT), where these attacks are known to degrade perfor-
mance [51,81]. Such networks are especially vulnerable given that their constituent
devices are often battery-powered and, therefore, energy is a scarce resource that
must be conserved.
With this setting in mind, we consider the following problem: Alice wishes
to guarantee transmission of a message m to Bob over a wireless communication
channel. However, there exists an adversary, Carol, who aims to prevent commu-
nication by jamming transmissions over the channel. Our solution to this problem
makes use of a relatively new technique called resource competitiveness. Infor-
mally, the idea behind resource-competitive analysis is to include the cost of the
adversary, T , as another parameter by which to measure the algorithmic perfor-
mance (details are provided in Section 1.1).
We assume a time-slotted model where it costs 1 to send, listen, or jam per slot
on the communication channel; these operations typically dominate the operational
costs of wireless devices in terms of energy usage (see Section 6 for discussion of
this issue). Our results guarantee the successful transmission of m and has the
following costs: if Carol incurs a cost of T to jam, then both Alice and Bob have a
cost of O(Tϕ−1 + 1) = O(T .62 + 1) slots in expectation, where ϕ = (1 +
√
5)/2
is the golden ratio. We are able to generalize to the setting where Alice wishes to
send m to n receivers, and we obtain a similar result.
In both cases, the smaller asymptotic costs to the good devices implies that it
is possible to “bankrupt” a jamming adversary. That is, in attempting to prevent
communication through jamming, Carol will deplete her onboard power supply far
more rapidly than either Alice or Bob (or multiple receivers) and, when this occurs,
communication will succeed. Note that such a result is useful even in the face of
continuous jamming; this is in contrast to most prior work where typically there
are constraints on how the adversary is permitted to jam (Section 1.3 discusses
previous work on jamming mitigation).
Our results holds even if (1) T is unknown; (2) Carol knows the algorithms used
by the communicating parties, but not their random bits; and (3) Carol can attack
using total knowledge of past actions of the communicating parties (i.e. Carol is an
adaptive adversary). Under the assumption of sufficient network traffic (in addition
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to m), we also demonstrate that the result holds when Carol knows the channel is
in use and then decides to jam (i.e. Carol is a reactive adversary).
1.1 Resource Competitiveness
Resource competitiveness is a new approach to designing robust algorithms for dis-
tributed systems [10, 36]. We now define what it means for a distributed algorithm
A to be resource competitive.
Assume a system with a set G of n good nodes that obey actions prescribed by
A. There exists an adversary who incarnates a source of disruption in the system.
For example, the adversary may represent (1) any number of malicious nodes that
collude and deviate arbitrarily from A, or (2) the effects of more benign failures
due to software or hardware faults.
Let Cost(α, v) denote the resource expenditure (or cost) to a good node v over
an execution α. A resource might be bandwidth, CPU cycles, energy, actual money,
or another useful domain-specific measure. Cost(α, v) is the cost incurred by v for
executing the actions prescribed by A in an execution α.
Let T (α) be the adversary’s total cost; this is typically unknown to the good
nodes. We simply refer to T and Cost(v) as α is implicit. We define what it means
for A to be resource competitive:
Definition 1. AlgorithmA is (ρ, τ )-resource competitive ifmaxv ∈ G {Cost(v)} ≤
ρ(T ) + τ for τ > 0 and any execution.
In other words, A is resource competitive if the maximum cost incurred by any
good node is less than some function of the adversary’s total cost, ρ(T ), plus some
additive term τ . The function ρ is called the robustness function and it is a function
of T and possibly other parameters such as n. In designing A, we desire ρ to be
a slow-growing function. This implies that, as the amount of disruption increases,
the cost incurred by A increases slowly. Indeed, in dealing with jamming attacks,
we show that it is possible to achieve ρ(T ) = o(T ).
Why do we require τ? Note that when T = 0 — that is, there is no disruption
— the good nodes clearly cannot incur less than zero cost; τ represents the un-
avoidable cost to attain a goal even in the absence of disruption. Efficiency when
the level of disruption is low, or non-existent, is critical to efficiency. It useful to
make this separation explicit via τ , which we call the efficiency function, and it can
be a function of parameters such as n, but it is not a function of T .
Functions other than the maximum cost over all nodes may be appropriate de-
pending on the context. For instance, we may consider the average or median
cost. However, Definition 1 has been applied in the existing literature. Finally, we
typically report results using big-O notation of the form O(ρ(T ) + τ).
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1.2 Resource Competitiveness in Context
It is helpful to contrast the notion of resource competitive algorithms with a number
of related concepts.
Notions of Competitiveness. Competitive analysis is a well-known technique that
evaluates the worst-case performance of an online algorithm relative to an optimal
offline algorithmOPT [72]. While the inputs to an online algorithm can be viewed
as adversarially selected, there is no notion of cost to the adversary for selecting
certain inputs over others. In contrast, resource competitiveness places the cost to
the adversary directly in the performance metric (see Definition 1). Unlike online
analysis where it is impossible for an online algorithm to outperform OPT , a
resource-competitive algorithm can actually outperform the adversary by achieving
ρ(T ) = o(T ).
Game theory provides another measure of competitiveness known as the “price
of anarchy” which is the ratio of the worst-case Nash equilibrium to the global
social optimum [62, 71]. In resource-competitive analysis, each node either obeys
the protocol or it does not; in game theory, nodes seek to maximize their respective
utility functions. It is possible to address malicious behavior in the context of game
theory (see [1,2,19,49,75]). The incorporation of game theoretic concepts may be
an interesting direction for future work on resource-competitive algorithms.
Notions of Inflicting Cost. The idea of inflicting cost on an opponent arises more
explicitly in the domain of cryptography. A major differentiating aspect of cryp-
tographic approaches is that the length of a private key is decided prior to encryp-
tion. This roughly determines (i) how much the adversary must spend in order to
compromise the cryptosystem, and (ii) how much the good nodes must spend to
achieve a particular level of security. In contrast, resource-competitive algorithms
are adaptive in the following sense. When T = 0, there is a small upfront cost
quantified by the efficiency function τ . Then, as T grows, the cost function ρ(T )
grows commensurately and will dominate the cost of the algorithm when T grows
large enough; in this sense, resource-competitive algorithms are adaptive. This is
very different from having a predetermined cost.
Additional Related Ideas. An early example of considering an attacker’s re-
sources is the cryptosystem by Merkle [58] where computational puzzles are used
to inflict cost on an eavesdropper. However, the hardness of the puzzles must be
set a priori and, therefore this scheme lacks the adaptivity of resource-competitive
algorithms described above. Inflicting computational cost has been used to deter
spam email [30]. Another example arises in settings where an attacker controls
multiple identities. In such a network, one may issue a cost for joining via com-
putational puzzles [48, 73] or monetary penalties [17]. Similar ideas arise in pro-
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posals to mitigate applicaton-level DDoS attacks. Typically, a client must spend
bandwidth or computational resources prior to receiving service (see [55, 64, 76]).
In contrast to these results, resource-competitive analysis goes beyond simply in-
flicting cost by quantifying a relationship between the cost to the adversary and the
cost to the good nodes.
1.3 Related Work on Tolerating Jamming Attacks
Several works address applied security considerations with respect to jamming [4,
8, 52, 82] where the adversary deliberately disrupts the communication medium.
Defenses include spread spectrum techniques (frequency or channel hopping), map-
ping with rerouting, and others (see [54, 60, 80, 81]).
Recent applied work by Ashraf et al. [5] investigates a similar line of reason-
ing by examining ways in which multi-block payloads (each block in a packet has
its own cyclic redundancy code), so-called “look-alike packets”, and randomized
wakeup times for receivers can be used to force the adversary into expending more
energy in order to jam transmissions. The authors’ approach is interesting and the
use of look-alike packets to prevent an adversary from being able to differentiate
between different types of nework traffic is similar to our approach to foiling re-
active jammers (see Section 4). However, on the whole, their approach is quite
different from our own; moreover, analytical results are not provided in [5].
There are a number of theoretical results on jamming adversaries. Gilbert and
Young [38] give a Monte Carlo 1-to-n partial broadcast algorithm that is resource
competitive. However, the result critically depends on knowing n and still allows
the adversary to prevent a small, but constant, fraction of the nodes from receiving
the broadcast. Removing the reliance on n is challenging, but a Monte Carlo 1-to-n
broadcast algorithm is given by Gilbert et al. [35] for this case.
Similarly, the problem of interactive communication on noisy channels has
been examined from a resource-competitive perspective. Results in Dani [22] and
Dani et al. [23,24] address an adversary that can flip an unknown number of bits as
information is transmitted across a channel. However, this work differs critically
in that the goal is to minimize the latency of communication rather than energy
expenditure
Recently, Bender et al. [9] demonstrated that contention resolution – how to
coordinate access to a shared channel by multiple devices – can be accomplished
despite a powerful jamming adversary. Informally, the result guarantees expected
constant throughput in a setting where n requests are scheduled adversarially, and
each client is shown to require at most an expected polylogarithmic number of
channel-access attempts
Outside of resource-competitive results, there is large body of work on mitigat-
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ing jamming attacks in wireless sensor networks (see [84] for a survey). Gilbert et
al. [34] examines the duration for which communication between two parties can
be disrupted in a model with collision detection in a time-slotted network against
an adversary who interferes with an unknown number of transmissions. As we do
here, the authors assume channel traffic is always detectable at the receiving end
(i.e. silence cannot be “forged”). The authors employ the notion of jamming gain
which is, roughly speaking, the ratio of the duration of the disruption to the ad-
versary’s cost for causing such disruption. This is an interesting metric which can
gauge the efficiency of the adversary’s attack; however, it does not incorporate the
cost incurred by the correct parties in the system.
Pelc and Peleg [65] examine an adversary that randomly corrupts messages.
Results by Awerbuch et al. [6] and Richa et al. [68–70] consider an adversary
whose jamming is bounded within any sufficiently large time window. Under
this adversarial model, Ogierman et al. [63] study medium access in the signal-
to-interference-plus-noise ratio communication model. In the context of Sybil at-
tacks [29], Gilbert and Zheng [39] devise methods for tolerating a jamming adver-
sary using coordination amongst the communicating parties, and this is generalized
to a completely decentralized scenario by Gilbert, Newport and Zheng in [37].
In settings where devices have access to more than one channel, a number
of theoretical results have been proposed. Dolev et al. [27] address a variant of
the gossiping problem when multiple channels are jammed. Gilbert et al. [33]
derive bounds on the time required for information exchange when a reactive ad-
versary jams multiple channels. Meier et al. [57] examine the delay introduced by
a jamming adversary for the problem of node discovery, again in a multi-channel
setting. Dolev et al. [28] address secure communication using multiple channels
with a non-reactive adversary. Recently, Dolev et al. [26] consider wireless syn-
chronization in the presence of a jamming adversary. Emek and Wattenhofer [31]
examine the effectiveness of frequency hopping against an adversary who jams a
strict subset of the available channels.
There are also game-theoretic treatments for jamming attacks, and we refer
the interested reader to the survey by Manshaei et al. [56] for a comprehensive
treatment of this area.
The problem of robust communication has also been considered in the context
of reliable broadcast where devices are laid out on a grid model [11, 13–15, 43,
44, 46, 74]. Listening costs are accounted for by King et al. [43, 44], but jamming
adversaries are not considered. Alistarh et al. [3] assume collision detection and
achieve authenticated reliable broadcast with the use of cryptography. With a re-
active jamming adversary, Bhandhari et al. [16] give a reliable broadcast protocol
when the amount of jamming is bounded and known a priori; however, correct
nodes must expend considerably more energy than the adversary. Progress towards
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fewer broadcasts is made by Bertier et al. [12]; however, each node spends signifi-
cant time in the costly listening state.
Finally, a preliminary version of our results appeared in [45]; however, we fo-
cus strictly on the single-hop case as this provides the most compelling results. This
current version of our work contains additional exposition regarding the design
of algorithm design, revised (and, we believe, clearer) versions of certain proofs,
along with arguments and discussion that were previously omitted. Additionally,
we consider an overlooked attack that was not addressed in [45] (discussed in Sec-
tion 2.4). Finally, we note that the lower bound originally provided in [45] is not
provided here, since more recent work in [35] gives a stronger bound that is asymp-
totically tight.
1.4 Our Model
We describe our network model and define the communication problem addressed
in this work.
Las Vegas Property: Communication ofm from Alice to Bob must be guaranteed
with probability 1; that is, we require a Las Vegas algorithm. An obvious motiva-
tion for this Las Vegas property is a critical application, such as the dissemination
of an important security update, where success is paramount.
The Las Vegas property has additional merit in multi-hop wireless networks
where Monte Carlo algorithms may not be adequate. In particular, the failure
probability in any single hop of a route may be small in the size of the broad-
cast neighborhood n. However, for large networks of total size N , it may be the
case that n ≪ N and so a union bound over the path length may fail to offer a
high-probability guarantee of correctness.
Channel Utilization: Sending or listening on the communication channel by Alice
and Bob occurs in discrete units called slots. For example, under the common
IEEE 802.11g, a slot may correspond to an actual time slot (9µs) in a time division
multiple access (TDMA) type access control protocol. For simplicity, we assume
that the message m fits within a single slot; otherwise, we can send m piecewise.
The cost for sending or listening is 1 per slot. This is a normalized cost meant
to reflect the fact that sending and listening on the channel typically dominates the
operational costs of LPN devices. For example, in the WSN setting, the send (at
a transmit power of 0 dBm) and listen costs for the popular Telos motes [66] are
38mW and 35mW, respectively, and these far exceed the other operations costs for
an active device. A similar relationship between the send and listen costs holds for
the older, well-known MICA family of devices [21].
When Carol jams a slot, she disrupts the channel such that no communication
is possible; jamming costs 1 per slot. T denotes the total amount Carol will spend
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over the course of the algorithm; this value is unknown to either Alice or Bob a
priori.
In practice, disrupting communication within a slot may be less costly than
sending a full message. However, so long as the relative costs for sending, re-
ceiving, and jamming are correct to within some (possibly large) constant factor,
our asymptotic results hold. Further discussion of this issue, and other practical
concerns, is provided in later in Section 6.
If two or more messages are sent within a single slot (a message collision),
or the slot is jammed, then the slot is said to be noisy. If a slot is noisy, this is
detectable by a party who is listening at the receiving end of the channel, but not
by the originator of the transmission. For example, a transmission (jammed or
otherwise) from Alice to Bob is detectable only by Bob; likewise, a transmission
(jammed or otherwise) from Bob to Alice is detectable only by Alice. A party does
not know why a slot is noisy; it may be due to a message collision or to jamming,
but the party only learns that the channel is in use. Finally, a slot which is not noisy
and does not contain a single message is said to be clear.
The Communicating Parties: If Alice is faulty, there is clearly no hope of com-
municating m; therefore, Alice is assumed to be correct. In other words, Alice can
never be spoofed by the adversary Carol.
Regarding Bob, we define two cases. In Case 1, communications from Bob are
always trustworthy. That is, Bob is never spoofed by Carol and we treat Carol as
a separate third party. This is a benign case, and it corresponds to situations where
communications sent by Bob can be trusted and jamming ofm is the only obstacle.
In Case 2, Carol may spoof Bob.1. We emphasize that this can lead Alice to
be uncertain about whether to trust Bob. This uncertainty corresponds to scenarios
where a trusted dealer attempts to disseminate content to its neighbors, some of
whommay be spoofed or have suffered a Byzantine fault and are used in an attempt
attempt to consume resources by requesting numerous retransmissions.
The Adversary: Carol has full knowledge of past actions by Alice and Bob. This
allows for adaptive attacks whereby Carol may alter her behaviour based on ob-
servations she has collected over time. Furthermore, under conditions discussed in
Section 4, Carol can also be reactive: in any slot, she may detect activity on the
channel and then jam; however, we assume that she cannot detect when a party is
listening.
1Equivalently, we can consider that Carol is Bob, or controls Bob completely. Conceptually, the
only two parties are then Alice and Carol
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1.5 Design Goals for our Algorithm
In designing our resource-competitive algorithm, we have several goals. In terms
of correctness, to reiterate, we want to guarantee (with probability 1) that Bob
receives m.
It is also important that both Alice and Bob have termination conditions. For
example, when Bob receives m, he should soon terminate such that he can either
perform other network tasks, or power down to conserve energy. Similarly, when
Alice is certain that Bob has received m, she should terminate; from an energy-
aware perspective, it is no good to have Alice be unsure of Bob’s state and, as a
consequence, keep resending m in perpetuity.
We also desire the following three performance properties with regards to cost.
First, we would like ρ(T ) = o(T ) such that Alice and Bob both incur asymptoti-
cally less expected cost than Carol when T is large. Jamming attacks are effective
because a correct device is often forced to incur a higher cost relative to an attacker.
However, if the correct parties incur asymptotically less cost than Carol, then Alice
and Bob enjoy the advantage, and Carol is faced with the problem of having her
energy resources consumed disproportionately by her attempt to prevent commu-
nication.
Second, we want τ to be small. This property guarantees that the cost of run-
ning our resource-competitive algorithm is low when there is little to no attack.
Third, we want our results to be fair: Alice and Bob should incur the same
worst case asymptotic cost relative to Carol.
1.6 Our Results
Let ϕ = (1 +
√
5)/2 denote the golden ratio. We also draw attention to the well-
known relationship that Φ = ϕ − 1 = 1/ϕ = 0.618... where Φ is known as the
golden ratio conjugate. Our main result is stated below.
Theorem 1. Let Carol be an adaptive adversary that jams for T slots. There exists
a resource-competitive algorithm that guarantees Bob receives m, both parties
terminate, and has the following properties:
• In Case 1, the expected cost to Alice and Bob is O(T 0.5 + 1). In Case 2, the
expected cost to Alice and Bob is O(TΦ + 1) = O(T 0.62 + 1).
• Both parties terminate in an expected O(T 2) and O(Tϕ) slots for Cases 1
and 2, respectively.
In other words, we have ρ(T ) = O(T 0.5) and ρ(T ) = O(T 0.62) for Case 1 and
Case 2, respectively, and τ = O(1) for both cases. Later, in Section 4, we demon-
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strate that Theorem 1 still holds when Carol is also reactive so long as there is
sufficient network traffic in addition to the sending ofm.
When Alice wants to send m to n receivers, a similar result is achievable. We
consider the analogue to Case 2 where Carol can spoof any subset of the receivers
and/or jam the communications of any/all parties. In this setting, we have the
following theorem:
Theorem 2. Let Carol be an adaptive adversary that jams for T slots. There exists
a resource-competitive algorithm that guarantees all receivers obtain m, and all
parties terminate, and has the following properties that hold with high probability
in n:2
• The cost to Alice and Bob isO(TΦ+lnϕ n) and O(TΦ+lnn), respectively.
• All parties terminate within O(Tϕ + lnϕ n) slots.
Roadmap. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
proceed through the design process of our algorithm in order to motivate each step.
In Section 3, we analyze our algorithm for Cases 1 and 2, and prove Theorem 1. In
Section 4, we define the conditions under which we can tolerate a reactive adver-
sary. We then demonstrate how our analysis can be amended to address a reactive
adversary. In Section 5, we generalize the Alice and Bob setting to a general broad-
cast problem where Alice needs to transmit m to multiple receivers. In Section 6,
we provide some additional motivation for our network model. Finally, we con-
clude with some open problems in Section 7.
2 Algorithm Design and Analysis
We incrementally build towards our resource-competitive algorithm. At each step,
our design decisions are explained.
2.1 A Naive Attempt
As a first attempt, Alice and Bob can try to outspend the adversary. For example,
let transmission of m be attempted over ℓ slots. In each even-indexed slot, Alice
sendsm while Bob listens. In each odd-indexed slot, if Bob has not receivedm, he
sends a negative acknowledgement (nack) message; otherwise, Bob terminates.
Alice listens in each odd-indexed slot and, if Alice receives a nack, she continues
onto the next even-indexed slot and sends m. Similarly, if Alice detects a noisy
odd-indexed slot, she interprets this as the situation where Bob sent nack but the
2With probability at least 1− 1/n. We will sometimes use w.h.p. as an abbreviation.
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ITERATION-1 for any round
Send Phase: For each of ℓ slots do
• Alice sends m with probability 2/
√
ℓ
• Bob listens with probability 2/√ℓ
If Bob received m, then he terminates
Nack Phase: For 1 slot do
• Bob sends a nack message
• Alice listens
If Alice listened to a clear slot, then she terminates
Figure 1: Pseudocode for ITERATION-1.
slot was jammed; therefore, she continues with the protocol. However, if Alice
detects a clear odd-indexed slot, she knows Bob received m and terminated since
the adversary cannot forge a clear slot; in this case, Alice safely terminates.
While Alice and Bob both finish correctly, note that if the adversary jams
T consecutive even-indexed slots, then Alice and Bob each send and listen for
2T + 2 slots. Therefore, Alice and Bob each spend more than twice what the ad-
versary spends; that is, ρ(T ) > 2T and the adversary rapidly disables each party
by depleting the respective energy supplies. This illustrates why jamming is often
an effective attack.
2.2 Towards a Resource-Competitive Guarantee
An initial attempt at a resource-competitive approach is ITERATION-1 in Figure 1.
In the Send Phase, Alice and Bob send and listen each with probability 2/
√
ℓ. If
Bob ever receivesm, he terminates the protocol. In the Nack Phase, if Bob has not
terminated, he sends nack to Alice during the single slot asking her to enter into
a new round. If Alice hears nack, or if the slot is jammed, she proceeds into the
next round; otherwise, if the slot is clear, she terminates. Let a round refer to the
execution of a Send Phase and the corresponding Nack Phase.
Using a birthday-paradox-like argument, there is likely to be a non-jammed slot
where both Alice sends m and Bob listens; this is true even if a constant fraction,
say 1/2, of the slots are jammed. Therefore, communication likely succeeds unless
the adversary jams more than half of the slots. In a Send Phase where more than
half of the slots are jammed – referred to as a blocked Send Phase — then Bob
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ITERATION-2 for round i ≥ 1
Send Phase: For each of the 2ci slots do
• Alice sends m with probability 2/2(c−a)i
• Bob listens with probability 2/2(c−b)i
If Bob received m, then he terminates
Nack Phase: For 1 slot do
• Bob sends a nack message
• Alice listens
If Alice listened to a clear slot, then she terminates.
Figure 2: Pseudocode for modified ITERATION-2.
may not receive m. But now T = Ω(ℓ) while both Alice and Bob spend only
O(
√
ℓ) = O(
√
T ) in expectation. Therefore, to prevent communication in the
round, the adversary must incur a cost that is roughly quadratically larger. This is
exactly the flavor of result that we seek.
Are we done? No, there are two shortcomings to ITERATION-1 and we de-
scribe the first here. Let us focus on the Send Phase and consider what happens if
the adversary forces k consecutive rounds with blocked Send Phases. The adver-
sary spends T = Ω(kℓ) while each party spends O(k
√
ℓ) = O(T/
√
ℓ) in expec-
tation. Therefore, for T > ℓ, we no longer have the quadratic advantage obtained
above for a single blocked Send Phase.
This problem arises because each blocked Send Phase imposes equal asymp-
totic cost on the adversary. In contrast, imagine if the cost of the final blocked
Send Phase equaled the total cost of all previous O(k) blocked Send Phases. Then,
the quadratic advantage would still hold by the same reasoning as above; simply
apply the same analysis to the final blocked phase. We can achieve this property by
increasing the length of the Send Phase as an exponential function of the number
of rounds completed so far.
Figure 2 provides the pseudocode with this modification implemented; we
name this intermediate algorithm ITERATION-2. The length of the Send Phase
is 2ci where the constant c > 0 is left unfixed (to be as general as possible) and will
be determined later.
The probabilities of Alice sending and Bob listening are also modified such
that the expected cost to Alice is O(2ai) and to Bob is O(2bi), where a > 0 and
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b > 0 are constants that we leave unspecified for now. However, given that a
birthday-paradox-like argument is used to show that Alice and Bob succeed in
communication, then we require a+ b = c to make our analysis work.3
To illustrate what is meant by such an argument, we sketch some analysis for
c = 2 and a = b = 1. For simplicity, assume a weaker adversary who jams each
slot with probability pj . Later, in Section 3, we provide a rigorous analysis that
holds against our more powerful adversary.
First, consider the case of “light jamming”, say pj ≤ 1/2. Since a = b = 1,
Alice sends and Bob listens with probability Θ(1/2i) per slot. The probability that
Bob receivesm in slot j is:
= Pr(slot j not jammed)× Pr(Alice sends in slot j)
×Pr(Bob listens in slot j)
= (1− pj)
(
2
2i
)(
2
2i
)
The probability that Bob fails to receive m over all 2ci = 22i slots in the Send
Phase is at most: (
1− 4(1 − pj)
22i
)22i
≤ e−2
Therefore, when (roughly) at most half the slots are jammed, there is a constant
probability of success, but this argument requires a+ b = c.
Conversely, consider pj > 1/2; for example, perhaps pj = 1 and all slots are
jammed in the Send Phase. Clearly, Alice will fail in sending m to Bob. However,
we do “succeed” in making Carol incur significantly more cost. The expected cost
to Carol is T = Ω(2ci) while Alice and Bob each spend O(2i) = O(
√
T ) in
expectation. Therefore, we recover the quadratic result above for a blocked Send
Phase.
Finally, we highlight the fact that c > 2 does not improve this advantage. For
example, if we set c = 4, then we require a + b = 4 and the maximum expected
cost to either party is minimized by setting a = b = 2 and this still yields an
expected cost to Alice and Bob of O(
√
T ).
2.3 Robustness to Attacks in the Nack Phase
The second shortcoming of ITERATION-1 (and also of ITERATION-2) involves the
Nack Phase under Case 2. Recall that Bob can be spoofed and his communications
can be jammed. Assume that Bob receives m and terminates. Then, in the very
3More generally, we need a+ b ≥ c, but we seek to minimize cost and so we opt for equality.
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ITERATION-3 for round i ≥ 1
Send Phase: For each of the 2ci slots do
• Alice sends m with probability 2/2(c−a)i
• Bob listens with probability 2/2(c−b)i
If Bob received m, then he terminates
Nack Phase: For each of the ℓ slots do
• Bob sends a nack message
• Alice listens with probability 4/ℓ
If Alice listened to a clear slot, then she terminates.
Figure 3: Pseudocode for ITERATION-3.
next Nack Phase, the adversary may spoof a nack message and force Alice to ex-
ecute another round. In each subsequent Send Phase, the adversary will do nothing
(in order to avoid any cost) and then send another nack in the next Nack Phase.
Therefore, in each round i, Alice incurs a cost of roughly 2ai in expectation while
the adversary has a cost of 1. Through this attack, the adversary can force Alice to
quickly deplete her energy supply.
Note that even if messages from Bob could be authenticated, the adversary may
simply generate noise which will yield the same result. This is unavoidable since
collision detection is used as a reliable negative acknowledgement.
This problem arises because it is “too cheap” for Bob to force Alice to proceed
into the next round. Intuitively, a remedy is to increase the cost required for Bob to
prevent Alice’s termination. As with the Send Phase of ITERATION-1, this could
be accomplished by setting the length of the Nack Phase to be, say, ℓ and requiring
Bob to send a nack in each slot. Therefore, Bob is making a “down payment” and
this should be large enough to deter the adversary from spoofing Bob in the Nack
Phase.
Should Alice verify the down payment by listening to all ℓ ≥ 4 slots? She is
already incurring an expected cost of 2ai from the preceding Send Phase, so she
could afford to spend the same in the Nack Phase without changing her asymptotic
cost. But what happens if the algorithm runs sufficiently long such that 2ai exceeds
ℓ? Instead, as we show in Section 3, Alice can sample each slot with probability
4/ℓ in the Nack Phase; this only contributes additional expected cost of 4. The
adversary may attempt to spend less than ℓwhilst spoofing Bob, but Alice’s random
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ITERATION-4 for round i ≥ 2/b
Send Phase: For each of the 2ci slots do
• Alice sends m with probability 2/2(c−a)i
• Bob listens with probability 2/2(c−b)i
If Bob received m, then he terminates
Nack Phase: For each of the 2bi slots do
• Bob sends a nack message
• Alice listens with probability 4/2bi
If Alice listened to a clear slot, then she terminates.
Figure 4: Pseudocode for ITERATION-4.
strategy is adequate to thwart such behavior. The pseudocode for this modification
is given in Figure 3.
Finally, we note that fixing the length of the Nack Phase to be ℓ in each round
runs into a problem similar to that faced in the Send Phase of ITERATION-1: multi-
ple consecutive blocked Nack Phases – where more than half the slots are jammed
– will degrade the resource-competitive ratio. Therefore, we adopt the same so-
lution by increasing the length of the Nack Phase as a function of the number of
rounds completed so far. Since Bob spends an expected 2bi in the Send Phase, the
length of the Nack Phase can also be 2bi without increasing his asymptotic cost.
The pseudocode for these modifications is presented as ITERATION-4 in Fig-
ure 4.
2.4 Handling Variance of Cost
Consider the following strategy by the adversary. All slots in each consecutive
Send Phase are jammed until a round r is encountered where Alice sends 2cr in
the corresponding Send Phase. Note that Alice sends probabilistically, so there
is a small, but non-zero, probability of this event occurring in each round, and
the adversary’s strategy means it will eventually occur with probability 1. At that
point, T = Θ(2cr) and Alice’s cost is Θ(T ) which is clearly poor.
Why not modify the algorithm such that Alice randomly selects exactly 2ai+1
slots in which to send prior to executing the next Send Phase? This prevents any
variance in cost and, therefore, prevents the above attack.
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To see why this is a bad idea, note an advantage of having Alice decide ran-
domly whether to send on a per-slot basis: an adaptive adversary has no more
power than a non-adaptive one. This is because the action Alice takes in the cur-
rent slot is independent of what she has done in the previous slots. In other words,
knowledge of the players’ past actions does not help Carol plan her jamming in the
next slot. Therefore, this design choice provides a useful property for tolerating an
adaptive adversary.
Selecting a fixed number of slots to send in a priori deprives us of this property.
For example, if Alice does not send m in slot 1 of the Send Phase, an adaptive
adversary learns of this prior to its decision on whether to jam in slot 2. The
absence of sending in slot 1 implies that the probability that Alice sends in slot 2
has increased given that she must send in exactly 2ai+1 slots; that is, these events
are dependent. For the same reason, the probability of a slot in which Alice sends
and Bob listens changes as we proceed through the Send Phase. The adversary
may use this information to improve its jamming and, at the very least, analyzing
such an algorithm seems difficult.
Instead, we make the following modification. In the Send Phase, if Alice has
sent in 2ai+2 slots, she remains silent for the remainder of the phase. Similarly, if
Bob has listened in 2bi+2 slots, he performs no more listening for the remainder of
the phase. This cutoff for either party bounds the cost to be at most a constant fac-
tor more than the expectation. In other words, the cost to Alice and Bob is O(2ai)
and O(2bi), respectively (the additional constant factors are useful in applying a
Chernoff bound later on in the analysis). The same modification is made to the
Nack Phase: if Alice has listened in 2ai+2 slots, she performs no more listening
for the remainder of the phase. The pseudocode for this final design decision is
presented in Figure 5 as ROBUSTTALK.
This design maintains independence between events in each slot up until the
cutoff point. Also, in each slot up until this cutoff point, the probability of a slot
where Alice sends and Bob listens is always the same at 4/2(c−a)i+(c−b)i . Of
course, once the cutoff point is reached, the adversary learns this and does not need
to perform any more jamming; however, up to this point, we preserve the robust-
ness to an adaptive adversary. In analyzing the impact of either party reaching
the cutoff in a round, we will pessimistically assume failure and incorporate the
cost of this round for each party. However, in Section 3, we will show that this a
low-probability event and does not impact the expected cost.
2.5 Description of ROBUSTTALK
We summarize a round i of ROBUSTTALK:
• Send Phase: This phase consists of 2ci slots. If Alice has sent in less than 2ai+2
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ROBUSTTALK for round i ≥ 2/b
Send Phase: For each of the 2ci slots do
• If Alice has sent in less than 2ai+2 slots in this
phase, she sends m with probability 2/2(c−a)i
• If Bob has listened in less than 2bi+2 slots in this
phase, he listens with probability 2/2(c−b)i
If Bob received m, then he terminates
Nack Phase: For each of the 2bi slots do
• Bob sends a nack message
• If Alice has listened in less than 2ai+2 slots in this
phase, she listens with probability 4/2bi
If Alice listened to a clear slot, then she terminates.
Figure 5: Pseudocode for ROBUSTTALK.
slots, then she will send m in the current slot with probability 2
2(c−a)i
. This yields
an expected cost of 2(c−a)i+1 over the entire phase. If Bob has listened in less than
2bi+2 slots, he will listen in the current slot with probability 2
2(c−b)i
. This yields an
expected total cost of 2bi+1 over the entire phase.
• Nack Phase: This phase consists of 2bi slots. If Bob has not received m, then he
sends a nack in all 2bi slots. If Alice has listened in less than 2ai+2 slots, then she
will listen in the current with probability 4/2bi (note that i ≥ 2/b is required) for
an expected total cost of 4 over the phase.
Termination Conditions: As discussed in Section 1.5, termination conditions are
important and we highlight these here. Bob terminates the protocol upon receiving
m. Since Alice cannot be spoofed, as discussed in Section 1.4, this termination
condition suffices.
Alice terminates if she listens to a clear slot (neither noisy nor containing a
nack message) in the Nack Phase; since jammed slots are detectable by Alice
while listening (Section 1.4), this condition suffices. That is, Alice continues into
the next round if and only if (i) Alice listens to zero slots or (ii) all slots listened
to by Alice in the Nack Phase contain a blocked slot or nack message. There are
two situations where this occurs:
• Send Failure: Bob has not received m.
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• Nack Failure: Bob has terminated and Carol either spoofs nack messages or
jams slots in order to trick Alice into thinking a valid nack was sent but jammed.
Nack Failures and Cases 1 & 2: Note that an “acknowledgement” is indicated
by having at least one clear slot in the Nack Phase. A Nack Failure refers to the
situation in which, by the end of the Nack Phase, Alice believes Bob is alive and
has failed to receive m.
In Case 2, as discussed in Section 2.3, a Nack Failure may occur via an attack in
the Nack Phase after Bob has received m and terminated. Carol may spoof Bob in
the Nack Phase by making it appear as if Bob did not receive m and is requesting
that both he and Alice proceed into the next round. This behavior keeps Alice
active and incurring a cost. Critically, this attack affects Alice only; if Bob has not
terminated, a nack message will be issued anyway and the attack accomplishes
nothing. Therefore, we need only consider this attack in the situation where Bob
has terminated.
In Case 1, no jamming occurs in the Nack Phase and, therefore, no Nack Failure
can occur. We note that, in Case 1, the Nack Phase can be shortened to a single slot
– the algorithm ITERATION-2 will suffice – where Bob sends his nack message
and Alice listens; however, this does not change our asymptotic cost for Case 1.
Since our current presentation applies to both cases, we proceed with analyzing
ROBUSTTALK.
3 Analysis of ROBUSTTALK
Throughout, assume ceilings on the number of slots indicated for use by Alice or
Bob if it is not an integer. For any given round, we say it is a blocked Send Phase if
Carol jams at least half of the slots in the Send Phase; otherwise, it is a non-blocked
Send Phase. Similarly, a blocked Nack Phase occurs if Carol jams or spoofs nack
messages from Bob in at least half the slots in the Nack Phase; otherwise, it is a
non-blocked Nack Phase.
Bounds on constants a, b, c: We make a few important remarks about these con-
stants. Note that if a ≥ b, then the expected cost to Alice is at least as much as
the expected cost to Bob. But recall that, in Case 2, the adversary can spoof Bob.
Therefore, this allows Carol to cause a Nack Failure with at most the same cost as
what Alice incurs in the preceding Send Phase (note that Carol will avoid listening
in the Send Phase and incur zero cost there). As discussed in Section 2.3, we must
avoid this since it admits an energy-draining attack against Alice. Therefore, in
Case 2, we require a < b.
Additionally, our analysis will depend on a birthday-paradox-like argument (in
Lemmas 2 and 4) to show that m or a nack message is successfully transmitted
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across the channel. As sketched in Section 2.2, we will need that a+ b = c for the
analysis to work.
Finally, as discussed in Section 2.2, we assume that c ≤ 2. Consequently,
a < 2 and b < 2.
Our analysis is composed of two pieces. First, we consider “light jamming” where
we have no blocked phases. We show that Alice succeeds in communicating m
to Bob with probability at least 1 − e−2 in each non-blocked Send Phase. Given
that Bob has terminated, a similar result is shown for the probability that Alice
(correctly) terminates in a non-blocked Nack Phase.
Second, we consider “heavy jamming” where we address blocked phases. Given
the exponentially increasing length of the phases, intuitively the expected cost is
dominated by the cost to the parties in the last blocked round. We can then use this
cost to compare against Carol’s cost T .
In both situations, the issue of variance described in Section 2.4 adds a subtlety
to our calculations. For light jamming, we only show constant probability of suc-
cess in non-blocked phases so long as neither Alice nor Bob reach their respective
cutoffs.
For heavy jamming, note that the adversary decides when the last blocked
round occurs. For example, what if the adversary jams all slots until the (low-
probability) event that Alice reaches her cutoff point in the Send Phase? This
highlights the problem of conditioning on the adversary’s final blocked round in
order to calculate the expected cost.
Our modifications in Section 2.4 permit a clean analysis. We bound the number
of rounds in which either party reaches its respective cutoff. We can show that this
occurs with probability exponentially small in the round index i, and therefore
the impact on the expected cost to each party is negligible. We make use of the
following Chernoff bound:
Theorem 3. ( [59]) LetX1, . . . ,Xn be binary random variables such that Pr(Xi) =
p and let X =
∑n
i=1Xi. For any δ, where 0 < δ < 1:
Pr(X > (1 + δ)E[X]) ≤ e−δ2 E[X]/3
Define a failed round to be a round in which either Alice or Bob reaches a
cutoff in either the Send or Nack Phase; otherwise, it is non-failed round. We now
bound the probability of a failed round as a function of the round index i:
Lemma 1. For any round i ≥ 1 the probability of a failed round is at most
exp(−2ai/3) + exp(−2bi/3).
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Proof. In the Send Phase of round i, let the binary random variable Xj = 1 if
Alice sends m in slot j; otherwise, Xj = 0. Letting X =
∑2ci
j=1Xj , then:
E[X] =
2ci∑
j=1
E[Xj ] =
2ci∑
j=1
(2/2(c−a)i) = 2ai+1
by linearity of expectation. A similar calculation for the Nack Phase yields an
expected cost of 4. Therefore, over epoch i, Alice’s expected cost is 2ai+1 + 4 for
i ≥ 1. By Theorem 3, using δ = 1 yields that the probability of exceeding this
expected cost by a factor of at least 2 is less than e−2
ai/3.
In the Send Phase of round i, let the binary random variable Yj = if Bob listens
in slot j; otherwise, Yj = 0. Letting Y =
∑2ci
j=1 Yj , then:
E[Y ] =
2ci∑
j=1
E[Yj ] =
2ci∑
j=1
(2/2(c−b)i) = 2bi+1
by linearity of expectation. There is an additional 2bi cost associated with the Nack
Phase. By Theorem 3, the probability of exceeding the expected cost by a factor of
at least 2 is less than e−2
bi/3.
By Lemma 1, the probability of a failed round is very small as a function of the
round index i. We will show that the contribution of failed rounds does not impact
our asymptotic analysis.
We now present the light jamming portion of our analysis.
Lemma 2. Consider a blocked Send Phase in a non-failed round. The probability
that Bob does not receive the message from Alice is at most e−2.
Proof. Let s = 2ci be the number of slots in the Send Phase. Let pA be the
probability that Alice sends in a particular slot. Let pB be the probability that Bob
listens in a particular slot. Let Xj = 1 if the message is not delivered from Alice
to Bob in the jth slot. Then:
Pr[m is not delivered in the Send Phase]
= Pr[X1X2 · · ·Xs = 1]
= Pr[Xs = 1 | X1 X2 · · ·Xs−1 = 1] ·
s−1∏
i=1
Pr[Xi = 1]
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Let qj = 1 if Carol does not jam in slot j; otherwise, let qj = 0. The value of qj
can be selected arbitrarily by Carol. Then:
Pr[Xi = 1 | X1X2 · · ·Xi−1 = 1] = 1− pApBqj
Substituting for each conditional probability, we have:
Pr[X1X2 · · ·Xs = 1] = (1− pApBq1) · · · (1− pApBqs)
=
s∏
j=1
(1− pApBqj)
≤ e−pApB
∑s
j=1 qj
≤ e−2
where the last inequality follows from:
pApB
s∑
j=1
qj ≥ (2/2(c−a)i)(2/2(c−b)i)(s/2)
= (2/2(c−a)i)(2/2(c−b)i)(2ci/2)
= 2
since a + b = c and there is no blocked send phase which means Carol jams at
most s/2 slots.
Note that Lemma 2 handles adaptive (but not reactive) adversaries. A simple
but critical feature of tolerating adaptive adversaries is that the probability that a
party is active in one slot is independent from the probability that the party is active
in another slot. Therefore, knowing that a party was active for k slots in the past
conveys no information about future activity. For reactive adversaries, we need
only modify Lemma 2 and we address this later (see Section 4).
Lemma 3. Assume there are no blocked Send Phases and no blocked Nack Phases.
The expected cost of each party is O(1).
Proof. We compute the expected cost over both non-failed and failed rounds for
i ≥ 1; note that this can only overestimate the expected cost since ROBUSTTALK spec-
ifies i ≥ 2/b and b < 2.
Using Lemmas 1 and 2, the expected cost to Alice is at most:
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∞∑
i=1
e−2(i−1)O(2ai) +
∞∑
i=1
exp
(
−2Θ(i−1)
)
O(2ai)
= O(1)
∞∑
i=1
(
2a
e2
)i
= O(1)
where the last line follows from the fact that a < 2 and the sum of a geometric
series. Similarly, the expected cost to Bob is at most:
∞∑
i=1
e−2(i−1)O(2bi) +
∞∑
i=1
exp
(
−2Θ(i−1)
)
O(2bi)
≤ O(1)
∞∑
i=1
(
2b
e2
)i
= O(1)
where the last line follows from the fact that b < 2 and the sum of a geometric
series.
Lemma 4. Assume that Bob has receivedm by non-failed round i, and that round
i has a non-blocked Nack Phase. Then, the probability of a Nack Failure is at most
e−2.
Proof. Let s = 2bi denote the number of slots in the Nack Phase and let p = 4/2bi
denote the probability that Alice listens in a slot. For slot j, define Xj such that
Xj = 1 if Alice does not terminate. Then, Pr[ Alice retransmits m in round
i + 1] = Pr[X1X2 · · ·Xs = 1]. Let qj = 1 if Carol does not jam in slot j;
otherwise, let qj = 0. The qj values are determined arbitrarily by Carol. Since
Alice terminates when she listens and hears a clear slot, then Pr[Xj = 1] =
(1− pqj). Therefore, Pr[X1X2 · · ·Xs = 1] ≤ e−p
∑s
j=1 qj ≤ e−2.
We now consider the heavy jamming portion of our analysis.
Lemma 5. Assume there is at least one blocked Send Phase. In Case 1, the ex-
pected cost to Alice and Bob is O(T a/c) and O(T b/c), respectively. In Case 2, the
expected cost to Alice and Bob is O(T a/c + T a/b) and O(T b/c), respectively.
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Proof. Let i ≥ 2/b be the last blocked Send Phase. Let j ≥ i be the last blocked
Nack Phase; if no such blocked Nack Phase exists, then assume j = 0.
Carol may choose i and j depending on the history of the execution. With this
notation in place, we can bound the cost to Carol, Alice, and Bob.
Carol: In Case 1, only blocked Send Phases occur and so T = Ω(2ci). In Case 2,
since there can be a blocked Nack Phase, the total cost to Carol is T = Ω(2ci+2bj).
Alice: We begin by calculating the expected cost to Alice prior to successfully
transmitting m. Using Lemmas 1 and 2, the expected cost to Alice prior to m
being delivered is at most:
O(2ai) +
∞∑
k=1
e−2(k−1)O(2a(i+k))
+
∞∑
k=1
exp
(
−2Θ(k−1)
)
O(2a(i+k))
= O(2ai) +O(2ai)
∞∑
k=1
(
2a
e2
)k
+O(2ai)
= O(2ai)
where the last line follows a < 2 and the sum of a geometric series.
Next, using Lemmas 1 and 4, we calculate the expected cost to Alice after
delivery of m; this addresses blocked Nack Phases possible only in Case 2. By
assumption, the last blocked Nack Phase occurs in round j and therefore Alice’s
expected cost is at most:
O(2aj) +
∞∑
k=1
e−2(k−1)O(2a(j+k))
+
∞∑
k=1
exp
(
−2Θ(k−1)
)
O(2a(j+k))
= O(2aj) +O(2aj)
∞∑
k=1
(
2a
e2
)k
+O(2aj)
= O(2aj)
where the last line follows a < 2 and the sum of a geometric series.
Therefore, in Case 2, the total expected cost to Alice is O(2ai + 2aj). Since
T = Ω(2ci+2bj), this cost as a function of T isO(T a/c+T a/b). For Case 1, there
are no blocked Nack Phases and so Alice’s cost is simply O(T a/c).
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Bob: We analyze the expected cost to Bob up until m is received. Note that we
assume Carol does not have any cost for blocked Nack Phases up until this point
since, as discussed in Section 2.5, there is no benefit to causing a Nack Failure via
jamming.
Using Lemma 2, Bob’s expected cost prior to receiving m is at most:
O(2bi) +
∞∑
k=1
e−2(k−1)O(2b(i+k))
+
∞∑
k=1
exp
(
−2Θ(k−1)
)
O(2b(i+k))
≤ O(2bi) +O(2bi)
∞∑
k=1
(
2b
e2
)k
+O(2bi)
= O(2bi)
where the last line follows b < 2 and the sum of a geometric series. Therefore, the
expected cost for Bob as a function of T = Ω(2ci) is O(T b/c).
We now prove Theorem 1 stated in Section 1.6:
Proof of Theorem 1: For both Case 1 and 2, when there are no blocked Send Phases
and no blocked Nack Phases, the expected cost to each party is O(1) by Lemma 3.
Therefore, we have τ = O(1).
For both Case 1 and Case 2, if there is at least one blocked Send Phase,
Lemma 5 gives the expected cost for Alice and Bob as O(T a/c) and O(T b/c),
respectively. Recall from Section 1.5 that we desire the worst-case relative costs
for Alice and Bob be equal. Therefore, setting a/c = b/c implies that a = b = 1
and c = 2. This yields ρ(T ) = O(T 0.5) and therefore the expected cost to each
party is O(T 0.5 + 1).
In Case 2, if there is at least one blocked Send Phase or Nack Phase, the ex-
pected cost to Alice and Bob is O(T a/c + T a/b) and O(T b/c), respectively, by
Lemma 5. The exponents of interest are now a/c, a/b, and b/c. Notice that a/c
and a/b both correspond to Alice’s expected cost, but that a/c < a/b. Therefore,
we need consider only a/b and b/c and we wish a/b = b/c to obtain fairness. Also
recall that we insisted on a+ b = c.
We now have three parameters and two constraints. However, this is sufficient
for us to derive useful values for a, b, and c. By dividing the second constraint by
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the first, we have:
(a+ b)b
a
=
c2
b
⇒
(
1 +
b
a
)
=
(c
b
)2
⇒
(
1 +
c
b
)
=
(c
b
)2
since
a
b
=
b
c
⇒
(c
b
)2
−
(c
b
)
− 1 = 0
Solving for the roots of this quadratic polynomial yields c/b = (1 +
√
5)/2 = ϕ
which is the golden ratio. Therefore, so long as the constants a, b, c are set such
that c/b = b/a = ϕ, ROBUSTTALK has ρ(T ) = O(TΦ) = O(Tϕ−1) = O(T 0.62)
where Φ = 1/ϕ = ϕ− 1.
How many slots in expectation occur prior to termination by both Alice and
Bob? We focus on Alice since she terminates after Bob. Assume pessimistically
that a blocked Send or Nack Phase prevents her from terminating. Carol can stretch
her budget the farthest by blocking the Nack Phase only as this incurs a cost of
2bi/2 rather than a cost of 2ci/2 for blocking the Send Phase.
For how many rounds can Carol do this? Solving for s in
∑s
i=2/b 2
bi/2 ≥ T
implies that s ≤ lg(T )/b + O(1). To this, we add the number of non-blocked
phases Alice endures before terminating; letX denote the random variable for this
number of rounds. Then, E[X] ≤ (1− e−2)+ 2 e−2(1− e−2)+ 3 e−4(1− e−2)+
... =
∑
∞
i=1 i e
2(1−i)(1 − e−2) = (1 − e−2)e2∑∞i=1 i(e−2)i by Lemmas 2 and
4. Therefore, E[X] ≤ 1/(1 − e−2) = O(1) which means Carol can delay the
termination by an additional O(1) rounds.
For each of the lg(T )/b+O(1) rounds, Alice experiences a delay of 2ci+2bi =
O(2ci) slots. This means that Alice terminates within an expectedO(2(c/b) lg(T )+O(c)) =
O(T c/b) slots. This translates toO(T 2) andO(Tϕ) for Cases 1 and 2, respectively.
Figure 6 provides an updated ROBUSTTALK with a setting of the constants a =
ϕ− 1, b = 1, and c = ϕ such that we obtain the guarantees of Theorem 1 for Case
2.
4 Tolerating a Reactive Adversary
Consider a reactive adversary Carol who can detect channel activity for free — that
is, distinguish between when the channel is clear and when it is busy — and then
jam. This ability to reactively jam is possible in WSNs [79].
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ROBUSTTALK for round i ≥ 2
Send Phase: For each of the 2ϕi slots do
• If Alice has sent in less than 2(ϕ−1)i+2 slots in this
phase, she sends m with probability 2/2i
• If Bob has listened in less than 2i+2 slots in this
phase, he listens with probability 2/2(ϕ−1)i
If Bob received m, then he terminates
Nack Phase: For each of the 2i slots do
• Bob sends a nack message
• If Alice has listened in less than 2ϕi+2 slots in this
phase, she listens with probability 4/2i
If Alice listened to a clear slot, then she terminates.
Figure 6: Pseudocode for ROBUSTTALK with the constants a = ϕ − 1, b = 1,
c = ϕ.
Carol can now detect thatm is being sent in the Send Phase and jam it without
fail. To address this powerful adversary, we consider the case where non-critical
data, m′, is sent over the channel by other participants in addition to Alice and
Bob. Carol can detect the traffic; however, she cannot discern whether it is m or
m′ without listening to a portion of the communication. For example, in practice,
she may need to listen to a part of the packet header in order to make such a
determination.
In a slot where channel activity is detected, if Carol listens for a portion of the
message, we assume she incurs a cost. Therefore, the cost to Carol is proportional
to (1) the number of messages to which she listens, and (2) the number of slots
in which she jams. Importantly, in the presence of m′, Carol’s ability to detect is
unhelpful since m′ provides “camouflage” form.
As an example, assume that all slots in the Send Phase are used either by Alice
to send m (as per our algorithm) or another party, Dave, whose transmissions of
m′ do not interest Carol. Assume that Dave’s transmissions are in the majority.
In this situation, detecting channel activity does not help Carol decide on whether
to jam; all slots are used. Regardless of how she decides to act, Carol can do no
better than picking slots independent of whether she detects channel activity. In
other words, channel activity is no longer useful in informing Carol’s decisions
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about whether to jam.
But assuming all slots are active is problematic. How is this guaranteed or
coordinated? We relax our assumption that all slots are used. Instead, we assume
that other network traffic occurs such that Carol will always detect traffic on at least
a small constant fraction of slots in the Send Phase. This traffic is assumed to be
random and independent of Alice sending m.
Upon detecting traffic, Carol may listen to a portion of the message to discover
if it ism orm′ and then decide on whether to jam, all at a cost of 1. However, this
is roughly as expensive — it is the same order of magnitude — as simply jamming
outright (also a cost of 1 in our model).
In practice, such situations can arise where communication occurs between
many participants, or via several distributed applications, or internally between
respective co-located networks. An attacker may wish to selectively target only
one component of the system in order to conserve energy and reduce the chances
of its malicious activity being detected.
As with any two messages, if m and m′ are sent over the channel in the same
slot, the two messages collide and Bob receives neither. Define a slot as active if
either m or m′ is sent in that slot. For this result only, redefine a blocked Send
Phase as one where Carol listens to or jams more than a 1/3-fraction of the active
slots in the Send Phase; otherwise, it is non-blocked. We provide a result analogous
to Lemma 2.
Lemma 6. Let Carol be an adaptive and reactive adversary. Then, in a non-
blocked Send Phase, the probability that Bob does not receive m from Alice is at
most e−2.
Proof. Let x = 2ϕi be the number of slots in the Send Phase. Consider the set
of slots used by all participants (such as Dave) other than Alice. We assume these
participants pick their slots at random to send, so that for any slot the probability is
2/3 that the slot is chosen by at least one of them. Let pA and pB be the probabilities
of sending and listening by Alice and Bob in the Send Phase, respectively.
Since we assume these messages m′ are sent independently at random, then
Chernoff bounds imply that, with high probability (i.e., 1−1/xc′ for constants c′, ǫ
and sufficiently large x) the number of slots y during which m′ is sent is greater
than (2x/3)(1 − ǫ) where x is the total number of slots in a phase.
In the same way, assume the number of slots in which Alice sends is at least
a′ = (1 − δ)xpA = (1 − δ)2(ϕ−1)i+1 with probability 1 − 1/xc′′ for a constant
δ, c′′ and sufficiently large x. The number of active slots is clearly at least y.
By definition of a non-blocked Send Phase, Carol listens to or blocks at most
x/3 active slots in the Send Phase. As Carol has no information about the source
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of a message sent in an active slot until she listens to it, her choice is independent
of the source of the message.
Given a slot in which Alice sends, there is at least a 1− (x/3)/y chance it will
not be listened to or jammed by Carol. The probability that this slot will not be
used by another participant is 1/3 and the probability that Bob will listen to the
slot is pB. Hence the probability of a successful transmission from Alice to Bob in
a slot for which Alice sends is at least:(
1− x
3y
)(
1
3
)
pB =
(
1− 1
2(1 − ǫ)
)(
1
3
)
pB
≥
(
1
3
− (1 + δ)
6
)
pB
≥
(
1
12
)
pB
for sufficiently large x (that reduces the size of δ) when y > (1− ǫ)(2x/3).
The probability that all messages that Alice sends fail to be delivered is at most
(1 − pB/12)a′ + 2/xc′′ where the last term is the probability of the bad event that
y or a′ is small and c′′ > 0 is a constant. Redefine pB = 24/((1 − δ)2(ϕ−1)i)
where the value 24 is set to off-set the additive 2/xc
′′
term. Note that this constant
factor increase in the listening probability does not change our asymptotic results
and our analysis in Section 3 proceeds almost identically. Therefore, we then have
(1− pB/12)a′ + 2/xc′′ ≤ e−2.
The ROBUSTTALK can be modified so that the initial value of i is large enough
to render the error arising from the use of Chernoff bounds sufficiently small; we
omit these details.
The required level of channel traffic detected by Carol is flexible. Different
values can be accommodated if the parties’ probabilities for sending and listening
are modified appropriately in ROBUSTTALK; our results hold asymptotically. We
emphasize that further revision of the arguments presented in Section 3 are minor.
Lemmas 3,4, and 5 do not require modification. Carol cannot decide to block only
when Alice is listening since detecting when a node is listening is assumed to be
impossible under our model. Alternately, Carol cannot silence a nack through
(reactive) jamming since this is still interpreted as a retransmission request. Using
Lemma 6, Theorem 1 follows as before with the same asymptotic guarantees.
Finally, we note that the conclusion of our argument aligns with claims put
forth in empirical results on reactive jamming; that is, such behavior does not nec-
essarily result in a more energy-efficient attack because the adversary must still be
listening to the channel for broadcasts prior to committing itself to their disrup-
tion [82].
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5 Resource-Competitive Local Broadcast
We present a resource-competitive algorithm, ROBUSTBROADCAST, that allows
Alice to send a message m to n neighboring receivers within her transmission
range; that is, our algorithm allows Alice to perform a local broadcast. We assume
that the quantity lnn is known to Alice; however, our results likely still hold if a
constant-factor approximation is known.
Throughout this section, we only consider the equivalent of Case 2 in this sec-
tion; that is, where Carol may spoof any receiver(s) and can jam their transmis-
sions. However, equivalent results trivially hold for the simpler Case 1. ROBUST-
BROADCAST preserves much of the same guarantees as ROBUSTTALK, and is fair
to all parties up to a polylogarithmic factor.
Our pseudocode is given in Figure 7. The probabilities for sending and lis-
tening are modified from ROBUSTTALK. Note that nack messages from multiple
receivers can (and likely will) collide in the Nack Phase. This is fine since such a
collision is due to either jamming or multiple receivers requesting a retransmission;
in either case, Alice will correctly resend.
If Carol jams, then we assume she chooses the subset of the receivers (which
can be the entire set of receivers) whose members do not receive m. In the liter-
ature, such an adversary is referred to as n-uniform [68]. The cost for jamming
is still 1 per slot regardless of how many receivers are jammed. We maintain the
definition in Section 2.2 of a blocked Send Phase (or Nack Phase): more than half
the slots are jammed.
In this n-party setting, the arguments regarding the Send Phase are in need
of minor revision, and we repeat these for completeness. We use nearly-identical
definition of a failed round: any round in which either Alice or any receiver exceeds
her/his respective expected cost by a factor of 2 or more in either the Send or Nack
phase; otherwise, it is non-failed round. In the multi-receiver case, we can bound
the probability of a failed round as a function of n.
Lemma 7. For any round i ≥ lg(4 ln n) the probability of a failed round is at most
1/n.
Proof. In the Send Phase of round i, let the binary random variable Xj = 1 if
Alice sends m in slot j; otherwise, Xj = 0. Letting X =
∑2ϕi
j=1Xj , then:
E[X] =
2ϕi∑
j=1
E[Xj ] =
2ϕi∑
j=1
(2 lnn/2i) = 2(ϕ−1)i+1 lnn
by linearity of expectation. A similar, calculation for the Nack Phase yields an
expected cost of 4 ln n. Therefore, over epoch i, Alice’s expected cost is 2(ϕ−1)i +
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4 ln n. By Theorem 3, the probability that she reaches her cutoff is at most:
exp (−2(ϕ−1)i+1 lnn/3) ≤ exp (−Θ(lnϕ n))
since i ≥ lg(4 ln n). In the Send Phase of round i, let the binary random variable
Yj = if receiver R listens in slot j; otherwise, Yj = 0. Letting Y =
∑2ϕi
j=1 Yj ,
then:
E[Y ] =
2ϕi∑
j=1
E[Yj] =
2ϕi∑
j=1
(2/2(ϕ−1)i) = 2i
by linearity of expectation. There is an additional 2i cost associated with the Nack
Phase. By Theorem 3, the probability that R reaches its cutoff is at most:
exp (−2i+1/3) ≤ exp (−8/3) ln n ≤ n−8/3
Taking a union bound implies that the probability that any receiver reaches its
respective cutoff is at most n−5/3. Finally, adding Alice’s error from the above
calculations yields the result.
Next, we prove the analogue to Lemmas 2 and 3 in the multi-receiver case.
Lemma 8. Consider a blocked Send Phase in a non-failed round. The probability
that any receiver does not receive the message from Alice is at most 1/n.
Proof. Let s = 2ϕi be the number of slots in the Send Phase. Let pA be the
probability that Alice sends in a particular slot. Let pR be the probability that a
fixed receiver listens in a particular slot. LetXj = 1 if the message is not delivered
from Alice to the receiver in the jth slot. Then:
Pr[m is not delivered in the Send Phase]
= Pr[X1X2 · · ·Xs = 1]
= Pr[Xs = 1 | X1 X2 · · ·Xs−1 = 1] ·
s−1∏
i=1
Pr[Xi = 1]
Let qj = 1 if Carol does not jam in slot j; otherwise, let qj = 0. The value of qj
can be selected arbitrarily by Carol. Then:
Pr[Xi = 1 | X1X2 · · ·Xi−1 = 1] = 1− pApRpRqj
30
Substituting for each conditional probability, we have:
Pr[X1X2 · · ·Xs = 1] = (1− pApRq1) · · · (1− pApRqs)
=
s∏
j=1
(1− pApRqj)
≤ e−pApR
∑s
j=1 qj
≤ e−(4 lnn/2ϕi)(s/2)
= e−2 lnn
= n−2
Taking a union bound over all n receivers yields the result.
Lemma 9. Assume there are no blocked Send Phases and no blocked Nack Phases.
With high probability, the cost to Alice and each receiver is O(lnϕ n) and O(lnn),
respectively.
Proof. For ease of exposition, let σ = lg(4 ln n). We compute the expected cost for
both non-failed and failed rounds for i ≥ σ. Using Lemmas 7 and 8, the expected
cost to Alice is at most:
∞∑
i=σ
(1/n)(i−σ) O(2(ϕ−1)i lnn) = O(lnϕ n)
Similarly, the expected cost to each receiver R is at most:
∞∑
i=σ
(1/n)(i−σ)O(2i) = O(lnn)
which completes the proof. Using a Chernoff bound (Theorem 5) provides the
guarantee with high probability.
Lemma 10. Assume that all receivers have received m by non-failed round i and
that round i is a non-blocked Nack Phase. Then the probability of a Nack Failure
is less than 1/n2.
Proof. Let s = 2i be the number of slots in the Nack Phase and let p = 4 lnn/2i be
the probability that Alice listens in a slot. For slot j, define Xj such that Xj = 1
if Alice does not terminate. Then, Pr[ Alice retransmits m in round i + 1] =
Pr[X1X2 · · ·Xs = 1]. Let qj = 1 if Carol does not jam in slot j; otherwise, let
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qj = 0. The qj values are determined arbitrarily by Carol. Since Alice terminates
when she listens and hears a clear slot, then Pr[Xj = 1] = (1− pqj). Therefore:
Pr[X1X2 · · ·Xs = 1] ≤ e−p
∑s
j=1 qj
≤ e−2 lnn
≤ n−2
which completes the proof.
The analogue to Lemma 5 is mostly unchanged, although we first establish the
following result:
Lemma 11. With high probability, the cost of a round i is O(2(ϕ−1)i lnn) and
O(2i) for Alice and each receiver, respectively.
Proof. For the Send Phase, define a binary random variable Xj = 1 if Alice sends
in slot j; otherwise, Xj = 0. Setting X =
∑2ϕi
j=1Xj , we have:
E[X] =
2ϕi∑
j=1
E[Xj ] =
2ϕi∑
j=1
2 ln n/2i = O(2(ϕ−1)i lnn).
By Theorem 3, the cost is within a small constant factor with high probability.
Similarly, in the Nack Phase, let the indicator random variable Yj = 1 if Alice
listens in slot j. Setting Y =
∑2ϕi
j=1 Yj , we have:
E[Y ] =
2i∑
j=1
E[Yj ] =
2i∑
j=1
4 ln n/2i = 4 lnn.
By Theorem 3, we can bound this to within a small constant factor with high proba-
bility. Therefore, with high probability, Alice’s cost isO(2(ϕ−1)i lnn)+O(lnn) =
O(2(ϕ−1)i lnn).
Consider a receiver R. Let X ′j = 1 if R listens in slot j of the Send Phase;
otherwise, X ′j = 0. Setting X
′ =
∑2ϕi
j=1X
′
j , we have:
E[X ′] =
2ϕi∑
j=1
E[X ′j ] =
2ϕi∑
j=1
2/2(ϕ−1)i = O(2i) = O(lnn)
where the last equality follows from i ≥ lg(4 ln n). By Theorem 3, we can bound
this to within a small constant factor with high probability. Taking a union bound
over all n receivers establishes the result.
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Lemma 12. Assume there is at least one blocked Send Phase. With high probabil-
ity, the cost to Alice and each receiver is O(Tϕ−1).
Proof. Let i ≥ lg(4 ln n) be the last blocked Send Phase. Let j ≥ i be the last
blocked Nack Phase; if no such blocked Nack Phase exists, then assume j = 0.
Carol may choose i and j depending on the history of the execution. With this
notation in place, we can bound the cost to Carol, Alice, and the receivers.
Carol: The total cost to Carol is T = Ω(2ϕi + 2j).
Alice: Using Lemmas 7, 8, and 11, with high probability the cost to Alice prior to
m being delivered is at most:
O(2(ϕ−1)i lnn) +
∞∑
k=1
(2/n)k−1O(2(ϕ−1)(i+k) lnn)
= O(2(ϕ−1)i lnn).
Next, using Lemmas 7, 10, and 11, we calculate the cost to Alice after delivery
of m; this addresses blocked Nack Phases. By assumption, the last blocked Nack
Phase occurs in round j and, therefore, with high probability Alice’s expected cost
is at most:
O(2(ϕ−1)j lnn) +
∞∑
k=1
(2/n)k−1O(2(ϕ−1)(j+k) lnn)
= O(2(ϕ−1)j lnn).
Therefore, with high probability, the cost to Alice is O(Tϕ−1).
Receivers: We analyze the cost to each receiver up until m is received. Note that
we assume Carol does not have any cost for blocked Nack Phases up until this point
since, as discussed in Section 2.5, there is no benefit to causing a Nack Failure via
jamming.
Using Lemmas 7, 8, and 11, prior to receiving m, with high probability each
receiver has cost at most:
O(2i) +
∞∑
k=1
(2/n)k−1O(2i+k)
= O(2i + lnn)
= O(2i).
Thus, with high probability, the cost to each receiver is O(T 1/ϕ) = O(Tϕ−1).
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Lemma 13. With high probability, Alice and all correct receivers terminate RO-
BUSTBROADCAST in O(Tϕ + lnϕ n) slots.
Proof. We analyze the time it takes for Alice to terminate since she does so only
after all receivers terminate. As with the analysis of ROBUSTTALK, we pessimisti-
cally assume a blocked phase prevents Alice from terminating in the current round.
Furthermore, Carol will only perform her jamming to block Nack Phases since this
maximizes the rounds that she keeps Alice alive.
Solving
∑s
i=lg(4 lnn) 2
i/2 ≥ T yields that the number of rounds that Carol can
block is at most s ≤ lg(T )+O(1). By the end of the very next round, all receivers
are guaranteed with high probability to receive the message by Lemma 8, and Alice
is guaranteed with high probability to terminate by Lemma 10. Therefore, with
high probability, Alice terminates after O(2ϕ(lg T+O(1)) + 2ϕ lg(4 lnn)) = O(Tϕ +
lnϕ n).
The following theorem on the resource-competitive properties of ROBUSTBROAD-
CAST follows directly from Lemmas 9, 12, and 13
Theorem 4. Let Carol be an adaptive adversary that jams for T slots. ROBUST-
BROADCAST guarantees m is received by all receivers and all parties terminate.
With high probability, Alice has a cost of O(Tϕ−1 + lnϕ n), each receiver has a
cost of O(Tϕ−1 + lnn), and all parties terminate within O(Tϕ + lnϕ n) slots.
6 Discussion
In this section, we provide some follow-up discussion regarding the practical as-
pects of wireless LPNs and how our abstract network model is motivated.
Sending and Listening Costs in Practice: Wireless network cards typically offer
states such as sleep, receive (or listen) and transmit (or send). While the sleep
state requires negligible power, the cost of the send and listen states are roughly
equivalent and dominate the operating cost of a device. For example, the send and
listen costs for the popular Telos motes are 38mW and 35mW, respectively and the
sleep state cost is 15µW [66]; therefore, the cost of the send/listen state is more
than a factor of 2000 greater and the sleep state cost is negligible. In the context
of our work, when a party is not active, we can assume it is in the energy-efficient
sleep state.
Disruption may not require jamming an entire slot, and so jamming a slot can
be less costly than sending/listening. However, we can assume a small m (or m
is broken into small packets) such that jamming and sending costs are within a
constant factor of each other.
34
ROBUSTBROADCAST for i ≥ lg(4 ln n)
Send Phase: For each of the 2ϕi slots do
• If Alice has sent in less than 2ϕi+2 lnn slots in this
phase, she sends m with probability 2 lnn
2i
.
• If this receiver has listened in less than 2i+2 slots
in this phase, it listens with probability 2
2(ϕ−1)i
.
Any receiver that obtains m terminates.
Nack Phase: For each of the 2i slots do
• Each receiver that has not terminated sends nack.
• If Alice has listened in less than 2ϕi+2 lnn slots in
this phase, she listens with probability 4 lnn
2i
.
If Alice listened to a clear slot, then she terminates.
Figure 7: Pseudocode for ROBUSTBROADCAST.
Slots: A time-slotted network corresponds to a time division multiple access (TDMA)-
like medium access control (MAC) protocol; that is, a time-slotted network. Two
examples are the popular IEEE 802.11 family of specifications, and the well-known
LEACH [40]. For simplicity, a global broadcast schedule is assumed; however, this
is likely avoidable if nodes maintain multiple schedules as with S-MAC [83]. Even
then, global scheduling has been demonstrated by experimental work in [50] and
secure synchronization has been shown [32].
Clear channel assessment (CCA), which subsumes carrier sensing, is a com-
mon feature on devices for detecting activity on the channel [67]; this is considered
practical under IEEE 802.11 [25]. Collisions are usually only detectable by the re-
ceiver [80]. When a collision occurs, a correct node discards any received data. We
assume that the absence of channel activity cannot be forged by the adversary; this
aligns with the empirical work by Niculescu [61] who shows that channel inter-
ference increases linearly with the combined rate of the sources. Finally, we also
note that several theoretical models feature collision detection (see [3,6,16,34,68]).
On Reactive Adversaries: CCA is performed via the radio chip using the received
signal strength indicator (RSSI) [41]. If the RSSI value is below a clear channel
threshold, then the channel is assumed to be clear [7]. Such detection consumes on
the order of 10−6 Wwhich is three orders of magnitude smaller than the send/listen
costs; therefore, a reactive Carol can detect activity (but not message content) at
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essentially zero cost. However, listening to even a small portion of a message costs
on the order of milliwatts and our argument from Section 4 now applies.
Cryptographic Authentication: We assume that the message m from Alice can
be authenticated. Therefore, Carol cannot spoof Alice. Several results show how
light-weight cryptographic authentication can be implemented in sensor networks [42,
47, 53, 77, 78].
What about having a shared secret for Alice and Bob that helps coordinate
their communication? This is outside the scope of this work, but we remark that
the adversary may capture a limited number of parties (such as Bob). These parties
are said to suffer a Byzantine fault and are controlled by the adversary [77, 80].
Given this attack, we emphasize that, while we assume authentication on Alice’s
side, attempts to share a secret send/listen schedule between Alice and Bob allows
Carol to manipulate parties in ways that appear difficult to overcome.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we provided resource-competitive algorithms for mitigating jamming
attacks in wireless LPNs. We see that the golden ratio arises naturally from our
analysis, and its appearance in this adversarial setting is interesting. Notably, a
later result in [35] demonstrates that our result for Alice and Bob is asymptotically
tight in that Ω(Tϕ−1) expected cost is necessary.
Future work includes pursuing resource-competitive algorithms to mitigate jam-
ming in multihop networks. Additionally, the application of these results to prob-
lems of consensus and leader election may prove fruitful. Finally, investigations
into more sophisticated communication models, such as the signal-to-interference-
plus-noise (SINR) model, may be of interest.
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